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A Survey of Attorney-Client Privilege in

Joint Defense
PATRICIA WELLES*

Slowly, courts are clarifying the scope of the attorney-client privilege that arises when codefendants or potential codefendants cooperate in a joint defensive effort. This article

surveys the progress of the law and raises questions about the
impact of cross-claims.
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INTRODUCTION

Fundamental differences over the concepts of privilege and

federalism caused Congress to reject Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) 501-5131 and to compose present Federal Rule of
Evidence 501,' which leaves the law in the same confused state.
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1981; former Research Editor, University of
Miami Law Review.
1. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 356-83 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules].

Numerous criticisms were directed at these proposed rules. Congress rejected the Advisory Committee's basic assumption that the importance of ascertaining the truth in the
courtroom outweighs the social value served by privileges. Some opponents of the proposed
rules pointed out the value that privileges serve by promoting truth outside the courtroom
through the fostering of confidences. Others questioned whether the adoption of such rules
of substance was within the Supreme Court's power under the enabling acts granting the
right to prescribe rules of practice and procedure. Still other critics attacked the proposed
rules as an unconstitutional abridgement of state-created substantive rights. Still other opponents characterized the proposed rules (particularly rule 501, which allowed courts to
honor state privileges) as being at odds with our system of federalism and as putting a
freeze on the law of privileges in the federal courts, which had previously encouraged flexibility. 2 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 501101], at 501-12 to -15 (1980).
2. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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The gravamen of the congressional disagreement was the dichot-

omy between substance and procedure, the legacy of Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins.3
The proponents of "privilege-as-substance" point to the impact that privileges have outside the courtroom. According to this

view, privileges result from efforts to further certain values our society prefers over its desire to expose the whole truth in the court-

room. These preferred values rest upon assumptions that certain
human behavior (such as openness with attorneys) is desirable; society encourages this behavior by providing protection from the
truth-seeking machinery of litigation.' Some commentators would
base these privileges on the right to personal privacy and the indi-

vidual's interest in freedom of expression. 5
On the other hand, the "privilege-as-procedure" coterie argues
that what is most important about the rules of privilege is the way
they alter the normal mode of proof in a trial.e Although a privilege may embody state social policies and affect conduct outside
the courtroom, inside the courtroom it merely affects the procedu-

ral functioning of the system by keeping relevant and otherwise
7
admissible evidence from the trier of fact.
Because assumptions about human behavior are inescapable,

so are privileges. The balance of this paper will proceed on the premise that the attorney-client privilege is here to stay, and will explore the logical extensions of one aspect of the privilege.

II. EvOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
Wigmore propounded the traditional conditions for all confidential communications and recognized the tensions over the dichotomy of substance and procedure that were later to worry Congress. Only communications meeting his stringent conditions, he
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. Pedersen, Federal,State Privilege Proposals Compared, 53 NEB. L. REV. 373 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Krattenmaker, TestimonialPrivileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 85 (1973).
6. Advisory Committee Note to Evidence Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. 230, 233 (1972).
The reality of the matter is that privilege is called into operation, not when the
relation giving rise to the privilege is being litigated, but when the litigation
involves something substantively devoid of relation to the privilege. The appearance of privilege in the case is quite by accident, and its effect is to block off the
tribunal from a source of information. Thus its real impact is on the method of
proof in the case, and in comparison any substantive aspect appears tenuous.

Id.
7. Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9, 22-23 (1974).
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averred, should be considered privileged.
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.'
After qualifying the attorney-client relationship under those criteria, Wigmore further developed the concept of privilege for communications to attorneys:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.'
The modern rationale for the attorney-client privilege (dealt
with in discarded Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503)0 places
intrinsic value on being able to confide in one's attorney. This
value inures only indirectly to the client's benefit, however. The
real impetus for freedom of consultation, it is averred, is the increased ability of attorneys to act more effectively in the interests
of justice, not in the interest of the client." (Many cases, however,
seem to concentrate more on the interests of the client.) According
to McCormick, the proper handling of claims and disputes that
may eventually lead to litigation requires a certain expertise. This
expertise being reserved to attorneys, it is they who must be fully
advised of the facts before the litigation process can be effective.
The detriment to justice (the fact-finder's ignorance of some truth)
that results from denying inquiry into conversations between attorney and client is outweighed by the benefits to justice (not to
mention the benefits to the client) in having lawyers operate
8. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis in original)
(footnotes omitted).
9. Id. at § 2292 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
10. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 361-62.
11. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. 1972).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:321

effectively.1 2
Admittedly, this "officer of the court" theory is based on an
unverifiable assumption, 18 but all privileges rest on such assumptions about human behavior. Only if one is willing to discredit or
abnegate all such assumptions because of their lack of susceptibility to tangible proof should one be willing to sweep away the privileges that rest on these assumptions."' When a rational, wellfounded assumption about behavior provides sufficient justification
for establishing or expanding a privilege, there Should be no hesitation to allow establishment or expansion, provided that doing so
will not violate any of Wigmore's four criteria.' 5
The "officer of the court" theory both correlates and conflicts
with a rationale behind both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Full access to information will
lead to a more just result. 16 The correlation lies in the encouraging
of clients to provide full information to their attorneys, in order
that their attorneys be effective advocates. 17 The conflict arises
concerning the use of the information garnered-the focus of the
privilege, of course, is protection of the information from disclosure, while the focus of the Federal Rules is dissemination of that
information.

III.

THE PRIVILEGE IN JOINT DEFENSE

Since Chahoon v. The Commonwealth" in 1871, United States
courts have recognized the attorney-client privilege in a joint defense. The general rule for joint defense situations can be stated
simply. If individually retained attorneys for codefendants communicate in the furtherance of a joint defense, that communication is
privileged. From this basic premise, courts have responded cre12. Id.
13. 2 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, 503[021 at 503-15 to -16.
14. Doubt about the justification for some long-standing, traditional assumptions seems
to have led to narrow judicial construction of some privileges and a concomitant hesitation
to recognize new privileges. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). This doubt also led to the absence of a provision for a general
physician-patient privilege in the 1973 Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. See Proposed
Rules, supra note 1, at 367-68.
15. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2285.
16. "Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts . . . is essential to proper litigation."
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); see D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EviDENCE § 207 (1978).
17. The "access to information" theory is especially compelling in the context of juint
defense. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
18. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
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atively in recognizing the exigencies of joint defense, applying the
rule to quite diverse sets of facts in a continual accommodation of
the tension between the search for truth in the courtroom and the
need to preserve a socially preferred relationship. Chahoon officially acknowledged an increasingly common fact about litigation
today: codefendants need to pool their resources to present the
best defense. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(b)(3) 19 is another verification of the necessity for some sort of privilege in joint
defense situations.
According attorney-client privilege in these situations is logically consistent with the modern rationale for the attorney-client
privilege. If the privilege exists to promote full disclosure of the
truth between a client and his attorney, the purpose is not impaired by merely multiplying the number of truth-tellers and confidence-receivers (the result of an extension of the privilege to joint
defense). Full disclosure of the truth between client and attorney
was said to increase the effectiveness of the administration of justice. This part of the rationale provides compelling reason to extend the attorney-client privilege to joint defense. In many cases,
the best defense depends on pooled information that allows complete and proper appraisal of every defendant's situation. Without
shared, privileged information, the effectiveness of a defense is
hampered, leading to possibly unjust results.
The privilege is, after all, born of the law's own complexity. The
layman's course through litigation must at least be evened by
the assurance that he may, without penalty, invest his confidence and confidences in a professional counsellor ....
That assurance is no less important or appropriate where a cooperative
program of joint defense is helpful or, a fortiori, necessary to
form and inform the representation
of clients whose attorneys
0
are each separately retained.2
The attorney-client privilege currently extends to any communication made in order to facilitate the rendition of legal services
to a client, "irrespective of litigation begun or contemplated";"1
19. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 362-64. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(b)(3) noted
that a frequent reason for various clients to retain different attorneys was the possibility of
.potentially conflicting interests in addition to the common binding interest between the parties. The needs of these cases seemed to be better met by allowing each client a privilege for
his own statements in such cases when different lawyers represent clients who have some
interests in common.
20. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
21. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at §§ 2294-2295.
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similar parameters seemingly should apply to joint defense situations. There is an obvious anomaly here, however: cases speak of
joint "defense," but how can there be a defense if there is no current or proposed suit against the cooperating parties? SCM Corp.
v. Xerox Corp.,22 discussed below, makes the extension to a nonlitigation setting. The basis for that court's broad construction of
the general rule of privilege is a commonsense recognition that legal advice is as much sought to avoid litigation as to conduct litigation. Indeed, in terms of social and legal policy, staying out of
court is more desirable than litigating. It would be anomalous to
recognize a privilege that protects only communications that stem
from a failure to maintain the more desirable course, withholding
protection from those who manage to achieve the very behavior
society ostensibly promotes. The same reasoning applies to codefendants, or more properly in this context, to clients with common
interests.
The few cases that have applied the attorney-client privilege
to joint "defense" deal with four general questions, yielding a
rough outline of the parameters of the rule:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Who are the participants in the communication?
How do the interests of the participants correlate?
When is the communication made?
What is the scope of the privilege?
A.

Who are the Participants?

The context of the privilege that most readily comes to mind
is that of exchanges between attorneys. For instance, in Continen3 attorneys
tal Oil Co. v. United States,"
representing two corporations exchanged confidential memoranda concerning interviews
with employees of both companies who had testified before a grand
jury. Counsel for each company argued that the exchange was
made in order that they might more effectively represent their clients during the grand jury investigation and at the resulting trial.
The attorney-client privilege formed the basis for upholding a motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum served upon the two
attorneys.
In State v. Emmanuel,24 the privilege was extended to statements made by one defendant to his codefendant's lawyer in the
22. 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976).
23. 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
24. 42 Wash. 2d 799, 259 P.2d 845 (1953).
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presence of the speaker's attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in preparation of a common defense. The court found
that the statements "were intended to be confidential at least as to
third persons not present at the conference. 2 5 Pettibone Corp. v.
CaterpillarTractor Co.'s confirmed that direct communication between a defendant and his codefendant's attorney, in the presence
of the speaker's attorney, is covered by the privilege.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United
States v. McPartlin,27 recently applied the privilege to statements
made to an agent of the codefendant's attorney in the absence of
the speaker's attorney. Codefendants in this fraud case had a common interest in discrediting the government's key witness. An investigator for defendant A twice interviewed defendant B, with the
permission of B's lawyer, to gain information in furtherance of that
common interest. At trial, A attempted to offer B's statement into
evidence to support A's defense. The court sustained B's objection
because the statements were made in confidence to his codefendant's attorney for a common, defensive purpose. The court pointed
out that shared information "can be necessary to a fair opportunity to defend" in criminal cases. 8
In Hunydee v. United States,'9 a new actor appears-the
other defendant. In this landmark decision, a husband (H) and
wife (W) were indicted on charges of income tax evasion. Because
of a possible conflict of interest, each defendant retained a separate attorney, but all met together to discuss common issues of
their defense. In front of H's attorney, W, and W's attorney, H
agreed to plead guilty in order to exonerate W. The court would
not allow W or her attorney to testify to H's admission, holding
that his statement was within the attorney-client privilege. "These
statements apprised the respective attorneys of Hunydee's position
at that time and influenced the course of their representation." 30
So far, there has been no case concerning direct defendant-todefendant communication. Presumably the result in Hunydee
would be the same if, instead of answering his attorney's question,
he had answered W's question in the presence of one or both attor25. Id. at 815, 259 P.2d at 854.
26. 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,419 (D. Neb. 1974).
27. 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979).
28. 595 F.2d at 1336. Note that courts have not distinguished between criminal and
civil actions when applying prior cases as precedent or when offering a rationale for the
existence of the privilege.
29. 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965).
30. Id. at 185.
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neys. It would be a very fine line, indeed, that would distinguish
between comments made directly to either attorney and comments
merely made in their presence but directed to a codefendant. The
Federal District Court, Southern District of New York, interprets
Hunydee as confirming that clients' direct communication would
fall within the comprehension of the rule. 1 Proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 503(a)(4),8' read together with subsection 503(b)(3),88
further supports this contention. In his analysis of these two subdivisions, Weinstein infers that "inter-client communications are
protected if the communication refers to a matter of 'common
's

interest'."'

Nevertheless, the better and safer practice, Weinstein points
out, is not to have clients at attorneys' conferences, such as those
discussed herein, because they may make extraneous statements
which can be taken as admissions." Often, however, a conference
with clients present is necessary6 Under Hunydee,87 despite
Weinstein's warning, careful structuring of the conference can fully
protect clients. They might be fully protected even without careful
structuring if the Hunydee rationale continues to be extended as it
was in the Southern District of New York.
B.

What are the Interests of the Participants?

The precedent-setting Chahoon case ss is the archetypal joint
defense situation. Three defendants met with two attorneys concerning their joint defense. The interests of all three defendants
were congruent, since they had been indicted for the same offenses.3 9 Such total identity of interest is not required in every cir31. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. at 388.
32. "A 'representative of the lawyer' is one employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal services." Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 361.
33. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating
the rendition of professional legal services to the client, . . by him or his lawyer
to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest ...
Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 361-62.
34. 2 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, V 503(b)(06], at 503-60.
35. Id. at 503-52.
36. See generally 406 F. Supp. 381.
37. 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965).
38. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
39. The Commonwealth introduced the testimony of a codefendant to establish incriminating statements made by defendant Chahoon at the conference. Chahoon attempted to
examine the codefendant's attorney about what had transpired at the conference to refute
the testimony. The attorney asserted the attorney-client privilege. The court held that since
all three defendants had the same defense, communication to any counsel at the meeting
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cumstance in order for the privilege to survive.40 For instance, in
Schmitt v. Emery,"1 a suit stemming from the collision of two cars
and a bus, the defendant bus driver made a statement for the de-

fendant bus company in anticipation of litigation, which the company then gave to its attorney. When plaintiff subpoenaed the
driver's statement, the bus company's attorney gave a copy of the
statement to attorneys for two other defendants. This exchange
was found not to be a waiver of the attorney-client privilege between the bus company and its attorney, because the purpose of

furnishing the copy was not to disclose its contents, but rather to
aid all the defendants in their efforts to exclude the statement.
The privilege applied in spite of the varying reasons the defendants had for wanting to exclude the statement.42
The copy is given and accepted under the privilege between the
attorney furnishing it and his client. For the occasion, the recipient of the copy stands under the same restraints arising from
the privileged character of the document as the counsel who furnished it, and consequently he has no right, and cannot be com43
pelled, to produce or disclose its contents.
The privilege applies when a limited common purpose necessitates disclosure and therefore negates implications of waiver.

Schmitt thus firmly established the validity of limited use of the
attorney-client privilege among defendants in civil litigation.
The reality of joint defense-namely, that defendants' interests often coincide only on certain issues-was again recognized in
United States v. McPartlin,a recent case." The claim of privilege
arose in the same context as in Chahoon: defendant Ingram attempted to introduce a statement that his codefendant McPartlin
was privileged. In the court's view, the counsel of each was the counsel of all, and all three
defendants had to release the attorney before he could testify. Id.
40. Cf. Vance v. State, 190 Tenn. 521, 230 S.W.2d 987, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 988
(1950): A & B were jointly indicted. After severance of their trials, A pleaded guilty. Before
B's trial, B and his two attorneys requested a meeting with A and his attorney. At this
meeting, B admitted that A's confession was true. At B's trial, the state was allowed to
introduce A's attorney to testify about B's admissions over B's claim of privilege. At the
time of the meeting, neither A nor his attorney had any interest in the outcome of the
conference, A having already pleaded guilty; thus there was no common interest and no
basis for a joint defense.
41. 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942).
42. Id. Two defendants based their objections on hearsay; the other two defendants
(the bus company and the bus driver) based their objection on the attorney-client privilege,
which attached when the driver, as the company's agent, communicated with the attorney.
43. 211 Minn. at 554, 2 N.W.2d at 417.
44. 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979).
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made in an interview with an investigator for Ingram's lawyer. The
statement was taken in cooperation with Ingram in an attempt to
discredit evidence damaging to both defendants, yet it also supported Ingram's defense that payments made by him were not
bribes, but were extorted by McPartlin. McPartlin claimed that his
statement to Ingram's attorney was privileged. The court's reasoning echoes that of Chahoon: when the defendants joined efforts on
one part of the government's case, the court stated that "the attor'45
ney for each represented both for purposes of that joint effort.
The McPartlin court rejected the notion that the privilege was
limited only to situations in which the positions of the codefendants are compatible in all respects, observing that uninhibited
communication among joint parties and their counsel is often important to the protection of each party's own best interest, and
that cooperation among defendants also serves to expedite the trial
and trial preparation." In dicta, the Seventh Circuit opined that
McPartlin was entitled to assert the privilege whether Ingram was
4
tried jointly or separately. 7
The disposition of issues arising from joint defendants' cooperation only on certain issues or for limited purposes4 8 indicates
that the presence of other incongruent interests is no barrier to
application of the privilege, provided the evidence given during cooperation was given in furtherance of a congruent interest. Indeed,
in Hunydee," the entire reason for hiring separate attorneys was
the existence of a conflict of interest.
Extension of the reasoning in these cases can be seen in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, Nov. 16, 1974,50 which deals
with whether communications between potential codefendants are
privileged when the government asserts that adversity could potentially exist between them. In re Grand Jury specifically concerns
individuals who were the targets of an SEC investigation. To establish the groundwork for a cooperative defense to an anticipated
SEC lawsuit which was later filed, these individuals met together
with their attorneys and attorneys for a corporation that would
later be named a codefendant. At all times, attorneys and clients
45. Id. at 1337.
46. Id. at 1336-37.
47. Id. at 1337. See also discussion of the duration of the privilege at text accompanying notes 103-12 infra.
48. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942).
49. 355 F.2d 183.
50. 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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proceeded in the belief that their confidences were protected by
the attorney-client privilege because they were being shared in furtherance of their joint defense. Because of the size and complexity
of the lawsuit, the attorneys divided their tasks and shared the information resulting from their work. A grand jury, investigating
suspected securities manipulations by the corporate defendant, issued a subpoena duces tecum to the corporate defendant's attorneys for production of documents related to the SEC investigation
and trial, including those resulting from the cooperation. When the
attorneys claimed privilege, the government countered that, the
privilege had never applied because the corporate client, International Controls Corporation (ICC), might have grounds against its
former officer and director, Vesco, who was a codefendant of ICC.
On the basis of this potential adversity, the government contended
that no joint defense was possible and thus no attorney-client privilege could attach to those portions of documents that reflected
Vesco's and ICC's participation in the meetings. The court ruled
against the government, stating that even if a later action by ICC
against Vesco was foreseeable, "[tihat alone would not have prevented Vesco and ICC from sharing confidential information for
the purpose of a joint defense against the immediate SEC action. . . . That a joint defense may be made by somewhat unsteady bedfellows does not in itself negate the existence or viability
of the joint defense."5 1 Thus, the existence of a potential, and even
probable, adverse relationship does not destroy the efficacy of the
privilege. Vesco was entitled to risk-sharing confidences with his
present codefendants, including ICC, and their lawyers, to
strengthen his immediate defense. The In re Grand Jury court, it
should be noted, assumed that the privilege would be lost in later
litigation between ICC and Vesco.52
This last assumption was based upon an analogy to the settled
principle that if two or more clients consult with one attorney concerning their joint interest and if the clients later have a falling-out
that results in a lawsuit instituted by one against the other, the
attorney-client privilege protecting their original consultation is inapplicable in the resulting litigation. 8 Subsequent adverse positions make the privilege inapposite, since it is apparent that
neither client can reasonably deny the other the use of information
51. Id. at 392.
52. Id. at 386.
53. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at § 91.
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that he gave to him."
If each defendant has his own attorney and confidences are
shared in planning a joint defense, is the risk that one defendant
will later sue the other greater than the risk that one joint client
will sue the other? If the answer is no, as is surely the case, then
the analogy between the two circumstances is a true one; subsequent litigation inter sese would destroy the .attorney-client
privilege.
What if a third party later institutes litigation against one codefendant and requests evidence from his fellow codefendants?
When a third party sues a former defendant, and the former codefendant merely cooperates by acting as a witness for the third
party, the attorney-client privilege will prevent the former codefendant from testifying about evidence gained from the former defendant during cooperation in their joint defense effort. Even motives for testifying, such as ill will (or adverse interests) that arose
between the former defendants will not destroy the privilege." In
State v. Archuleta," an individual agreed to testify for the state in
the perjury trial of his former fellow codefendants. The state tried
to claim the privilege, to avoid introduction of evidence that would
impeach its witness. The court suppressed the evidence since this
was not litigation between former codefendants, but litigation between the state (a third party) and the codefendants. The witness
was not a party to the action and could not alone destroy the
privilege.
The In re Grand Jury court, 57 it will be remembered, was
faced with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to attorneys for a corporation that had been a codefendant in an SEC action. The subpoena requested evidence which had been obtained in
cooperative interaction with other defendants to that action. Applying Archuleta, the court in In re Grand Jury held that because
the litigation at bar was between the grand jury (a third party) and
the defendants, not between former codefendants, the privilege
still attached to the subpoenaed documents. The court's reasoning
is compelling:
[T]o allow such disclosure would so further erode the privilege's
protection as to reduce joint defense to an improbable alternative. How well could a joint defense proceed in the light of each
54.
55.
56.
57.

8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2312.
See State v. Archuleta, 29 N.M. 25, 217 P. 619 (1923).

Id.
406 F. Supp. 381.
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co-defendant's knowledge that any one of the others might trade
resultant disclosures to third parties as the price of his own exoneration or for the satisfaction of a personal animus? The attorney-client privilege, carved out to ensure free disclosure between client and counsel, should not thus be whittled away. 8
At the time of the writing of the In re Grand Jury opinion, ICC
had two actions pending against Vesco 9 Despite this demonstrated adversity of interests, latent at the time of the conference
at issue, but patent at the time of decision, the court still found
the privilege to obtain against third parties, making clear both the
correlation to the privilege enjoyed by the single. attorney with a
single client, and the court's refusal to use 20/20 hindsight in making a determination of privilege.
In re Yarn Processing Patent Litigation" takes the attorneyclient privilege in joint defense farther than the leading cases. In
this patent-infringement suit, upon plaintiffs' motion to compel
production of documents that had been disclosed by one defendant
to two other defendants, the court commented that its finding of a
community of interest among defendants "does not, of course, constitute a prejudgment on the [codefendants'] relationship insofar
as it may be at issue in other phases of this litigation." ' It is apparent that this court realized that antagonistic interests might
surface in the litigation, yet it was willing to recognize a privilege
in a limited area despite the codefendants' possible adverse
stances. This perspicacious court carried its ruling a step beyond
even the decision in In re Grand Jury;" not only is the privilege
good despite possible adversity in later separate litigation, but it is
good even when codefendants may be antagonistic in other phases
of the litigation at issue. This is more than a recognition of "limited purpose" joint defense; it is an acknowledgement that defendants can and must play different roles vis-a-vis one another, according to the exigencies of the lawsuit, and has implications for
the defendant who later cross-claims against a cooperating
codefendant."
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 394.
Id. at 393.
177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 514 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
Id. at 514.

62. 406 F. Supp. 381.
63. See text accompanying notes 113-25, infra.
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When Is the Communication Made?

The timing of the communication for which privilege is later
sought is important in two respects. First, application of the privilege may hinge on the stage of the relationship between the attorney and the client. In the typical case," each defendant who has
been indicted or against whom a complaint has been filed retains
his own attorney before it becomes apparent that joining forces in
conducting a defense is the wisest course.
Nevertheless, In re Grand Jury" establishes that a formal retainer is not a prerequisite to applying the privilege. There a group
of defendants and their lawyers met with potential codefendants.
The potential codefendants, who had not yet retained their own
attorneys, were allowed to claim privilege to protect their statements at the meeting. This ruling complies with the established
principle that pre-retainer conferences may be privileged in single
attorney-client relationships." It is equally necessary for informal
attorney-client relationships in joint defenses to be subject to the
privilege. If they are not, a potential or actual codefendant could
not reap the benefits of joint consultation unless he had first formally retained counsel. For example, if he did not formally retain
counsel and it became apparent later in the trial preparation that
he needed independent representation, not only could he not use
the privilege to protect any statements he had made to that date,
but at trial his codefendants could not claim the privilege to prevent him from revealing his conversations. The context of conversations is often so revealing that without a logical extension of the
privilege to pre-retainer conversations, the benefits of the privilege
would be emasculated.
The second important aspect of timing concerns the intertwined matters of the clients' relationships with each other and the
stage of maturation of the conflict. As stated earlier, 7 the privilege
logically should apply to any communication that facilitates the
64. See, e.g., Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 822, and Schmitt v. Emery,
211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413.
65. 406 F. Supp. 381.
66. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2304. Communications with an attorney are
protected when a person seeks the benefit of his legal services. The client is protected in his

preliminary statements when making the overture, even if the overture is refused. If the
attorney indicates that he will not accept the particular person as a client, however, continued communication will not be privileged. The privilege will also not attach if a person
knowingly attempts to retain one who is already retained by his opponent. In these situations, he does not need or deserve the protection of the privilege. Id.
67. See text accompanying notes 22 and 23 supra.
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rendition of legal services to a client, regardless of the presence or
absence of litigation. Indeed, society should encourage legal consultation that allows clients with joint interests to avoid the travail of
the courtroom. 68 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp,'9 the only case to deal
with the effect of a nonlitigation setting upon the attorney-client
privilege, expresses a similar viewpoint:
The privilege need not be limited to legal consultations ... in
Corporations should be encouraged to
litigation situations ....
seek legal advice in planning their affairs to avoid litigation as
well as in pursuing it. The timing and setting of the communications are important indicators of the measure of common interest; the shared interest necessary to justify extending the privilege to encompass intercorporate communications appears most
litigations but is
clearly in cases of co-defendants and impending
70
not necessarily limited to those situations.
The court specifically found that common interests in the development of technology and the exploitation of patents were sufficient
to require the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
Whether the legal advice was focused on pending litigation or on
developing a patent program that would afford maximum protection, the privilege should not be denied when the common
In this setting of joint analysis and cooperinterest is clear ....
common interests in patent proative study, the three7 parties'
1
tection predominated.
Although Continental Oil Co. v. United States7 2 involved pre-indictment relationships 73 and thus not a purely nonlitigation setting, statements in the opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit underscored the importance of
privilege to any stage of a client's dealings with
extension of 7the
4
his attorney.
Several cases other than Continental Oil Co. and SCM Corp.
support the application of the privilege when persons, although not
codefendants, either potentially are codefendants or have such
close relationships as to make the "common interest" test applica68. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Multiple Party Situations, 8 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 179, 188-89 (1972).
69. 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976).
70. Id. at 513 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 514.
72. 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
73. See also Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965).
74. 330 F.2d at 350.
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ble. When a witness in an antitrust suit is reasonably to be considered a member of the class of alleged conspirators and extension of
the suit to include the witness is foreseeable 7 6 or when clients face
indictment on similar charges,7 6 the privilege has been applied to
protect communication. Factors in some patent cases (based on the
attorney's work product) that have overcome the lack of codefendant status have included potential liability of the nonparty if the
party lost the suit," and a close business relationship such as
partnership. 8
TransmirraProducts Corp. v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 7 9 a decision frequently cited in joint defense cases, was based on the
work-product doctrine, but its dictum is instructive when one is
considering the relationship of a party and nonparty. Plaintiff sued
Corporation X for patent infringement, discontinued the action,
and one month later sued Corporation Y on the same allegations,
then sought details of any assistance Y had given to X concerning
X's defense strategy. Though the action against Corporation X did
not include Corporation Y and the action against Y did not include
X, the court noted that the plaintiff implicitly recognized the community of interest linking the two defendants, since both actions
contained conspiratorial allegations as to the concerted activities of
X and Y.80 This conclusion strengthened the court's determination
that the two corporations had a community of interest in the litigation that protected their exchanges of information. The court
emphasized that plaintiff could have sued both X and Y in the
same action. At the time X was sued, it was obvious to Y that it
could reasonably expect to be sued also, and that it would inure to
Y's benefit to cooperate with X.81 "Such interchange is frequently
necessary. . . to enable proper appraisal of the conspiratorial acts
often alleged in antitrust suits."82 1
75. See, e.g., Pettibone Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 75, 419
(D. Neb. 1974).
76. See Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965), and Continental Oil v.
United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
77. Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
78. Stanley Works v. Haeger Potteries, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 551 (N.D. I1. 1964).
79. Transmirra Products Corp. v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 26 F.R.D. 572 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).

80. Id. at 579.
81. Id.

82. Id. (citing Note, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange
of Information, 63 YALE L.J. 1030, 1030 (1954)).
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Although both the policy behind the attorney-client privilege"3
and the special exigencies present in the attorney-client relationships comprised by a joint defensive effort seem to demand extension of the privilege to nonlitigation situations, it is probable that a
combination of factors will limit the application of the privilege.
The requirements of the test for "common interest" in most instances will be met only when parties face litigation. Also, the
stricture inherent in the term "joint defense" will provide stumbling blocks to later courts in expanding the reach of the privilege
to other cooperative situations and indeed to its logical limits.
D.

What Is the Scope of the Privilege?

Duration and breadth are the most complicated and least considered aspects of the attorney-client privilege as applied to joint
defense. The issue of duration is complicated by the possibility of
the parties assuming adverse positions later. This could occur
within the same litigation-for instance, codefendants might file
cross-claims or they might take opposing stands only on issues s4 in
which their interests diverge. The problem could also arise when
one defendant later sues another defendant in a separate but related suit,8 ' or when a third party sues one defendant and another
defendant testifies for the plaintiff. 6 As stated previously,8 7 if former clients disagree among themselves and subsequently become
opposing parties in a lawsuit the privilege is inapplicable. If the
later action is brought by a third party, however, the privilege still
applies.8 8
The basis of the privilege in joint defense is unity-unity of
interest and unity of defense of that interest. In a joint defense,
the attorney for one client becomes the attorney for all on the
common issues. Conversely, the client of one attorney becomes the
client of all the attorneys for those same common interests. The
individual defendants become a unit for purposes of applying the
privilege. Because of the hurdles that must be surmounted before
the "common interest" test is passed and the unit is formed, it is
83. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
84. See, e.g., In re Yarn Processing, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 514 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
85. See, for example, the situation involving Vesco and ICC in In re Grand Jury, 406 F.
Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
86. See, e.g., State v. Archuleta, 29 N.M. 25, 217 P. 619 (1923), in which the third party
was the government.
87. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
88. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11 at § 91.
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logical that the unity be sustained until some act is performed by
one of the defendants to destroy the unit. Merely acting as a witness in a suit brought by a third party should. not be considered a
sufficiently "destructive" act. 8 ' Only the finality of an actual suit
by one former codefendant against another should be capable of
eroding the basis for the privilege and thus the privilege itself. The
privilege is not lightly given; neither should action of the court or
of one who is benefiting from the privilege easily destroy it. As so
cogently explained in In re Grand Jury,90 to view the situation
otherwise would so seriously impair the efficacy of joint defense as
to vitiate the privilege entirely unless there were no conceivable
way for a participant in a joint defense to become the target of a
cross-claim or no possibility of his codefendant's being called as a
witness in a related action. This last circumstance alone is so improbable as to render the joint defense alternative a nullity.' 1
The logical conclusion, then, is that the privilege should endure as long as the unity of interest that engendered the privilege
endures. In general, unity of interest would last indefinitely, or until the former codefendants took affirmative steps to terminate the
union-i.e., filed suit one against the other. No case so far deals
directly with this problem, but inferences drawn from cases grappling with issues of "limited purpose" joint defenses and the work
product doctrine may be helpful.
1.

PERSONS WHO MAY CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE

The defendants in Chahoon"l cooperated in preparing a joint
defense, but had separate trials. 93 The court established the
"unity" requirement when it ruled that since the counsel of each
was the counsel of all, release by all the codefendants was necessary for any attorney to be able to testify. The former defendant,
however, was allowed to testify to an admission of one of his codefendants made during a joint conference.
The Advisory Committee of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence has criticized Chahoon for requiring the consent of all
cooperating defendants in order to release one defendant's attor89. See State v. Archuleta, 29 N.M. 25, 217 P. 619 (1923).
90. 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
91. Id. at 394.
92. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
93. The court implicitly recognized that separate trials were not a bar to application of
the privilege. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) for a similar
modern view.
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ney from the attorney-client privilege.

The Committee bases its

criticism on the actual or potential conflicts of interest that cause
codefendants to hire separate attorneys. The Committee has dealt
with such conflicts by drafting a rule allowing "each client a privi-

lege [only] as to his own statements. Thus if all resist disclosure,
none will occur."9 5 Under the proposed rule, if a client later wished

to testify as to his own statements, he could."
The Committee's approach is misguided. Even if their motive
was to further the federal courts' interest in admitting additional
evidence, 97 "to allow such disclosure would so further erode the
privilege's protection as to reduce joint defense to an improbable
alternative. '"9s If each defendant were free at any time to disclose

his own statements, what confidence could his codefendants place
in him, knowing that at any moment when his self-interest shifted
away from the joint cause, he could tell his tale? How could he tell
his tale without intimating "the content of the confidential communication of another, thereby violating the latter's right to prevent discovery"? 9 It would be extremely difficult for a defendant
to avoid disclosing the gist of his codefendant's statements while
outlining the context of his own statements. The viability of a rule
that would allow this result in the absence of head-on conflict (a
lawsuit by one defendant against another) is questionable.
Unity of interest, the policy underlying the application of privilege to a joint defense, demands the preservation of unity in the
absence of, an affirmative act terminating the union. As to attorneys, the Chahoon rule requiring the consent of all joint clients

before an attorney may testify on matters in which the clients have
common interests, is the logical choice.100 As to clients, one com94. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 76.
95. Id. at 77 (citing Continental Oil v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964)).
96. One author has suggested that such disclosure could result if the client received
immunity and testified for the government in a criminal case. Miller, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine: Protection from Compelled Disclosure in Criminal Investigation of a Corporation,12 U. S.F. L. REv. 569 (1978). But the In
re GrandJury and Archuleta cases belie this rationale when the later proceeding is a third
party action (e.g., government v. defendant), not one between two former codefendants. See
text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
97. See Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence and the Law of Privileges, 15 WAYNE L.
REv. 1286, 1312 (1969).
98. 406 F. Supp. at 394.
99. Comment, supra note 97, at 1312.
100. There is no irrebutable inference from the conduct of a joint defense, however,
that confidences were shared that would bar an attorney from subsequently representing a
party opposing a former codefendant. For instance, in Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 432
F. Supp. 694, affd, 566 F.2d 602, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1977), the court refused to
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mentator has proposed a hybrid of Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(b)(3) and the Chahoon rule:
A client may refuse to disclose and may prohibit the disclosure
of any confidential communications, or the contents thereof,
made by:
(1) the client, or
(2) his attorney, or
(3) the representative of either;
and communicated to:

(1) another client, or
(2) his attorney, or
(3) the representative of either,
in a matter of common interest to both clients.
Under this rule, a client in joint consultation would retain the
privilege as to his own communications, but would be restricted
in his disclosure to those communications which did not embody
the content of the privileged statements of another client. 10"
This rule allows a defendant to disclose his own statements as long
as he does not jeopardize his codefendants' expectations of
confidentiality.
2.

DURATION

No case thus far has dealt directly with the question of the
duration of the attorney-client privilege in joint defense situations.
Analogy may be made to opinions that discuss an attorney's work
product. 0 2
In a multidistrict patent antitrust case,108 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an attorney's
disqualify plaintiffs' attorney because evidence showed that no confidential information was
received in a prior joint defense.
Wilson P. Abraham Const. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977)
held that an attorney who received confidential information in the conduct of a joint defense breaches his fiduciary duty to the codefendants who were not his clients if he later
uses this information in his representation of another client against one of the codefendants.
101. Comment, supra note 91, at 1313.
102. The distinction between materials protected by the work product doctrine and information protected by the attorney-client privilege was first enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Basically, the work product doctrine is an independent source of
immunity from discovery, which protects the effectiveness of an attorney's trial preparation.
Kirkland v. Morton Salt Co., 46 F.R.D. 28 (N.D. Ga. 1968). The attorney-client privilege is a
separate and distinct immunity designed to protect the confidential disclosures between a
client and his attorney irrespective of pending or anticipated litigation. See C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 11, at § 87.
103. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavonaz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir.
1973).
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work product prepared for an earlier, unrelated case is not discoverable in the current case unless the party seeking discovery can
meet the requirements of Hickman v. Taylor.104 The policy behind
inviolability of work product was found "scarcely less applicable to
a case which has been closed than to one which is still being contested."'10 5 The decision was based not on the "rights or posture of
the litigants vis-a-vis each other,"' 6 but on the need to protect an
attorney's professional effort and preserve the confidential nature
of his task, which need "transcends the rights of the litigants."'0
Similarly, the attorney-client privilege in joint defenses continues
to be recognized despite later unrelated litigation by a third party
against a former codefendant. This recognition is not based on the
"rights or posture of the litigants vis-a-vis each other,"los i.e., a
third party versus a defendant, but is founded on the necessity of
protecting the integrity of the earlier unity of confidentiality and
cooperation. The litigation that gave rise to confidential association in a common defense may have terminated, but the policy
that fosters the privilege-namely, the protection and enhancement of a defendant's efforts to defend himself through the free
and confidential exchange of information and ideas with his codefendants and their counsel is nonetheless worth furthering. 0°'
Some work product cases allow the reach of the privilege to
extend only to later related cases," 0 but this eludes the policy of
the doctrine by making attorneys hesitant to assemble extensive
work product materials because of the concern that the material
would not be protected in a later, unrelated case. Similarly, to
limit the recognition of the attorney-client privilege in joint defense to cases related to the initial suit would vitiate the privilege,
reducing it to "an improbable alternative.""' Therefore, to provide
full protection and allow complete use of the privilege, participants
104. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Discovery may be properly had by a party: 1) when relevant
and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file, and production of those facts
appears to be essential to the preparation of one's case; 2) when witnesses are no longer
available or can be reached only with difficulty; and 3) when the party seeking to invade the
privacy establishes adequate reasons to justify production through a subpoena or court order. Id. at 511-12.
105. 487 F.2d at 483.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Compare the situation in which former codefendants end up as adversaries in later
litigation.
110. See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
111. 406 F. Supp. at 394.
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in a joint defense should be allowed to disclose information received in connection with confidential conferences, only if they become parties adverse to a former codefendant in a lawsuit.
Conflicting rulings on the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege in joint defense are bound to arise when there are separate, but concurrent, actions in different jurisdictions, especially in
patent or antitrust suits. In IBM Corp. v. United States,"' the
government was pressing antitrust actions in New York and in
Minnesota. A judge in Minnesota allowed the attorney-client privilege against production of certain documents and issued a protective order. Later, even though apprised of the Minnesota ruling,
the New York court compelled production of the same documents.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
this an abuse of discretion. Although the case did not concern joint
defense, the ruling is equally applicable and provides an appropriate guideline.
3.

CROSS-CLAIMS

The thorniest problem remains: What happens to the privilege
if cooperating codefendants file cross-claims in the original action?
In a literal sense, the parties are still involved in a third-party action; according to the applicable rule, the privilege still obtains."'
The defendants, however, are adverse parties on the cross-claim;
there is no privilege when parties are adverse."
No cases deal
with this collision between rationales.
One solution is to allow otherwise confidential information
into evidence only for purposes of the cross-claim. There are good
arguments against allowing this result, the most obvious being certain debilitation of the privilege, the problem that concerned the
court in In re Grand Jury."5 Parties would shun participation in a
joint defense unless they were quite certain that they would not
become the victim of a cross-claim. ' Also operating against this
solution is an assumption that juries cannot or will not discriminate among the different purposes for which evidence is
7
introduced."

112. 471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972).

113. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
114. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
115. 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See text accompanying note 58 supra.
116. That would be an improbable belief. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
117. See, e.g., Shepherd v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 103 (1933); C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 11, at § 59.
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A question of waiver also arises. If a defendant/cross-claimant
testifies about his own privileged statements, he waives his privilege in the disclosed statements. 11 8 Additionally, his testimony on
direct examination on only a portion of the privileged conversations thereby waives his privilege on the balance of the privileged
communication. 1 9 Even though the testimony concerning a part of
the privileged communications was allowed in, only for the limited
purpose of advancing the claim of the defendant/cross-claimant,
the general rule above would seem to allow the original plaintiff to
require testimony on the remainder of the privileged information
for the plaintiff's use in his case-in-chief. Such testimony might
well be injurious to joint defendants who have effected no such
waiver. The availability of the defendant/cross-claimant's testimony would certainly nullify the utility of participation in a joint
defensive effort.
A more acceptable solution is preclusion or severance of the
cross-claim. Cross-claims are not mandatory, but may be brought
later as independent actions.1 20 If, after cooperating in a joint defensive effort, a defendant who wished to press a cross-claim
against a codefendant were precluded within the original action
from using information gained from privileged joint conferences,
his options would be (1) to attempt to pursue the cross-claim without the benefit of the privileged information or (2) to bear the extra expense and effort of a separte action to be instituted after the
conclusion of the current litigation, when he would be allowed to
use the information to his advatitage. It is also probable that a severance would be granted in most cases on motion of the claimant's
co-defendants, to prevent prejudice. 21 Preclusion, therefore, would
be no more onerous an imposition than severance.
Weighing against mandatory preclusion or severance of the
cross-claim are the inherent risks any litigant must assume. Each
plaintiff or defendant bears the risk that other parties might bring
related actions against him, either as future independent lawsuits
or as cross-claims or counterclaims. The threat of future litigation
becomes simply another tactical consideration for the defendant in
his decision to join forces and pool information in order to bolster
his defensive efforts against the original plaintiff. This situation
was recognized in In re Grand Jury:
118. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at § 93.

119. Id.
120. See
121. See

FED.
FED.

R. Civ. P. 13(g) and comparable state provisions.
R. Civ. P. 42(b) and comparable state provisions.
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Those confidences might have placed Vesco at his peril in the
event that a private action were eventually instituted by ICC.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that such peril was anticipated
and appreciated by Vesco and his counsel, Vesco was entitled to
risk it for the sake of strengthening his immediate defense by
cooperation from and with ICC and the other co-defendants.' 22
The question still lingers, however, whether a defendant should be
forced to "risk it" or to forego the benefits of a joint defense that
might be "necessary to form and inform the representation of
clients. . ...",,28
Facilitating the goal of full disclosure is certainly imperative. 124 Only definitive standards will promote a desirable climate
for full use of the joint-defense privilege. To achieve these goals,
courts should keep the tactical aspects of joint defense to a minimum by precluding the filing of cross-claims by cooperating codefendants, or by requiring mandatory severance because of the innate prejudice to the cross-claimant's codefendants.
One might argue that preclusion or severance may be too
harsh when defendants have cooperated on only one item of evidence or one narrow issue;2 5 the amount of privileged information,
under those circumstances, can be so slight in proportion to the
admissible evidence as to make a separate trial too onerous. If,
however, a cross-claimant is allowed to testify about privileged
communication, even with disclosure restricted to information per-.
tinent to the cross-claim, the probability of injury to the codefendants is great enough to prevent an cooperation, even as to very
limited aspects of the defense.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The policy that supports the attorney-client privilege is twofold: furtherance of justice and protection of the client's interest.
Extending the privilege to all who formulate a joint defense is logical. This paper has surveyed the efforts of courts to make such an
extension and has suggested ways to deal with situations not yet
encompassed by judicial decision.

122. 406 F. Supp. at 392.
123. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 97, at 1312; Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege
and the Corporationin ShareholderLitigation, 50 So. CAL. L. REV. 303 (1977).
125. See, e.g., Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413.

